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Abstract
Drawing on Habermas’s notion of discourse ethics and 
agonistic democratic theory I off er an account that 
attempts to overcome the exclusions revealed by stateless-
ness by appealing to the mutability and contingency of 
community, as well as the fundamentally unsettled nature 
of the political. I argue that by placing discourse ethics, as 
a means to theorize the issues raised by statelessness and 
the idea of a claim to community, in dialogue with the 
agonistic emphasis on openness and the contestability of 
terms, we are provided with potential resources for concep-
tualizing more open notions of political membership.
Résumé
S’appuyant sur la notion d’éthique de la discussion 
chez Habermas et la théorie de l’agonisme démocrati-
que, l’auteur propose une lecture qui tente de surmonter 
les exclusions révélées par l’apatridie en faisant appel à 
la mutabilité et la contingence de la communauté, ainsi 
que la nature fondamentalement instable de la politique. 
L’auteur soutient qu’en ouvrant un dialogue entre l’éthique 
de la discussion, comme moyen de théoriser les questions 
soulevées par l’apatridie et l’idée d’une revendication de 
la communauté, et l’accent agoniste sur l’ouverture et la 
contestabilité des termes, nous obtenons des ressources 
pouvant potentiellement conceptualiser des notions plus 
ouvertes de l’appartenance politique.
Contesting Community: Th e Refugee as a Site of 
Tension
Writing in the mid-twentieth century with the horrors of 
the Second World War still close at hand, Hannah Arendt 
noted that the emergence of stateless persons as the “most 
symptomatic group in contemporary politics” served both 
as a catalytic factor in the emergence of totalitarianism and 
as a lasting crisis of the post-totalitarian world.1 Of course, 
since Arendt penned her far-sighted observations, the oft -
referred-to “humanitarian problem” that refugees and state-
less persons have been seen to pose has only become far more 
ubiquitous, with over 17 million people classifi ed as refugees 
and displaced persons to date.2 To be sure, our categories for 
describing the stateless have become more nuanced since 
Arendt’s time, but our progress in addressing her concerns 
has remained rather limited.3 Indeed, alongside the equally 
pressing international issues of immigration and humani-
tarian intervention, the questions posed by the phenomenon 
of widespread statelessness have only intensifi ed the degree 
to which commitments to universal human rights and the 
sovereign claims of political communities have been seen to 
clash, thereby complicating discussions of global justice and 
the emerging international legal norms of our increasingly 
interconnected present. Indeed, for our modern paradigm 
of human rights that has been philosophically advanced on 
universalistic grounds, and yet linked to the incorporation 
of such rights into national institutions and law, the refugee 
appears as a fi gure both least protected and most vulnerable 
under present international arrangements.
Yet despite the apparent challenges the position of the 
refugee appears to off er toward our contemporary under-
standings of citizenship and human rights, the issue of 
statelessness has received relatively little sustained attention 
within discussions of international justice. In many ways 
it appears as if the general consensus views statelessness 
as a status far too exceptional, and therefore peripheral, to 
merit direct concern. It is because of this general trend that 
this paper attempts in part to reorient normative political 
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theory to the particular quandaries and issues raised by 
statelessness. Th is is because, as I hope to indicate herein, 
an inattentiveness to the position of the refugee oft en dis-
torts or clouds discussions of international obligations and 
human rights, allowing us to gloss over the underlying 
inconsistencies in our prevailing understandings of inter-
national order and global justice. A central example of this 
blind spot in contemporary political theory is found in the 
later work of the seminal political theorist John Rawls. In 
his Th e Law of Peoples, an attempt to work out a theory of 
justice for international relations, Rawls entirely elides the 
ethical and political issues raised by immigration and state-
lessness–problematically articulating a vision of interstate 
relations that puts the imperatives of self-determination and 
human rights in stark confl ict. In this way, Rawls’s inatten-
tiveness to the contingencies of citizenship is emblematic 
of the refusal to recognize the articulation of the basis and 
bounds of community membership as a central political 
question. Moreover, as much of the critical reception of Th e 
Law of Peoples has suggested, the problems raised by such 
issues can only be neglected at the cost of considerable con-
ceptual poverty.
With the above considerations in mind, this paper will 
attempt to provide a provisional engagement with the 
particular issues raised by the position of the refugee and, 
more generally, to suggest that the questions of statelessness 
should occupy a far more central place in the considerations 
of normative political theory. In doing so, I will attempt to 
address whether, and if so how, our conceptions of com-
munity and citizenship should be transfi gured on account 
of the particular theoretical and ethical concerns raised 
by statelessness. Th e fi rst section will off er an account of 
the problematic status of the refugee by engaging with the 
work of Hannah Arendt to indicate how the phenomenon of 
statelessness reveals hidden tensions in our conceptions of 
political membership and universal human rights. Arendt’s 
incisive analysis brings to light the precarious position of the 
refugee as located out of the bounds of community, while 
also highlighting the particular dilemmas that any approach 
toward statelessness will have to address. Th e second sec-
tion will shift  focus from a diagnostic to a prescriptive 
dimension, by turning to the approach of discourse ethics 
off ered in Jürgen Habermas’s work as a potential means to 
theorize the issues raised by statelessness and the question 
of the claim or right to community. As will become clear, 
the approach off ered by Habermas is suggestive of novel 
ways of negotiating and transforming our conceptions of 
political membership toward a more just and cosmopolitan 
conception. However, while the paradigm of discourse eth-
ics provides a promising framework, I will suggest that this 
approach is in need of a supplementary orientation toward 
openness, given that the question of statelessness has at its 
very core the problematic of inclusion. In addressing this 
more fundamental dimension of the question of inclusion, 
I shall turn to the work and insights of the contemporary 
theorists of agonistic democracy, William Connolly and 
Chantal Mouff e. As will become clear, the focus of these 
theorists on the contestability of terms and the fundamen-
tally unsettled nature of the political provide resources for 
conceptualizing more open notions of political membership. 
Th e paper will conclude by suggesting how the approaches 
of discourse ethics and agonistic theory can be used to 
imagine formations of community that eschew the types of 
exclusion central to the production of statelessness.
Th e Problematic of Statelessness: Sovereignty and 
Human Rights
Having established our trajectory of analysis, our engage-
ment with the issue of statelessness will begin by turning 
to the work of Hannah Arendt. Her thought off ers a unique 
perspective on our contemporary historical situation that 
importantly challenges our orientation toward the relation-
ship of human rights and citizenship, providing a remark-
able vantage point from which to consider such problems 
anew. Arguably, the fi gure of the refugee is central to 
Arendt’s concerns regarding our forms of modern politics 
and community, in part driving her critical analysis in both 
Th e Origins of Totalitarianism and Th e Human Condition. 
However, it is in the former work that the situation of the 
refugee is given most explicit treatment, and it is Arendt’s 
analysis of the emergence of mass statelessness that I shall 
now address in order to briefl y explicate the problematic 
concerns raised by such phenomena.
As a project, Th e Origins of Totalitarianism represents 
Arendt’s attempt to understand the historically unpreced-
ented emergence of totalitarianism in the twentieth century 
through an extensive study of the diff use conditions under 
which it arose. In her study, Arendt specifi cally identifi es 
the emergence of widespread statelessness—the rendering of 
masses of people as rightless and uprooted—as one among 
many conditions that made possible the horrors of total dom-
ination in the modern world. Indeed, with the appearance of 
the refugee or stateless person as a pervasive phenomenon, 
many of the previously submerged dangers and contradic-
tions of the nation-state system came to the fore—perhaps 
most importantly in the conceptual and practical crisis 
inherent in the notion of inalienable universal human rights. 
In her discussion subtitled “Th e Decline of the Nation-State 
and the End of the Rights of Man” Arendt off ers a considera-
tion of the phenomenon of widespread statelessness dur-
ing the interwar era that delineates her views of the crucial 
implications of such developments.
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Arendt’s analysis begins by tracing the emergence of 
modern statelessness to the moment at which governments 
of the European continent began the theretofore unheard-
of process of revoking the citizenship of segments of their 
populations en masse. With such developments the fi gure 
of the “refugee” emerged in Europe: a stateless individual 
lacking any governmental protection. Arendt notes that the 
sudden presence of mass statelessness quickly proved to be 
more than the existing legal institutions of the nation-state 
system could accommodate. Both of the traditional rem-
edies to the hitherto exceptional position of the exile, the 
right to asylum and naturalization, quickly came to con-
fl ict with the sovereign rights of the state and, without any 
grounding in positive law, were quickly disregarded.4 But 
what was perhaps most striking was the manner in which 
commitments to so-called “human rights,” paradigmat-
ically expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, 
rapidly began to reveal their fragile and contingent basis 
amid such unprecedented developments.
In her discussion of the problematic nature of “human 
rights” Arendt draws our attention to the basis on which 
these rights were proclaimed—namely an abstract con-
ception of man generalized beyond his situation within a 
political community, a conception that depended on the 
assumption that these rights derived from no other source 
than man’s inherent nature. Any valid political system pre-
supposed these rights, and thus needed to recognize them 
in order to govern legitimately. But as Arendt notes, within 
a political system the sole guarantor of these rights was the 
political sovereign itself. A tension arose, in that the very 
rights set forth as natural and thus prior to the sovereign, 
relied upon the sovereign for their protection within the 
political community.
What Arendt wished to emphasize is that the rights 
enshrined in such proclamations of human rights actually 
refer to civic rights that can only have signifi cance in the 
context of membership in a political community. Th erefore 
what was revealed in the phenomenon of mass statelessness 
was the deep interrelation and dependency between so-
called “human rights” and membership rights within a pol-
ity. Th us the fundamental loss suff ered by the rightless was 
not a loss of a natural, inalienable right. It was rather the 
loss of their right to belong to a community in which such 
rights could have meaning, and of a place in the world in 
which their words and actions would be taken into account. 
Th is “right to have rights,” the fundamental right which the 
refugee lost, was completely absent from the framework of 
Th e Declaration of the Rights of Man. Th e very structure 
of such rights, in presupposing an abstract human nature 
as the source of their legitimacy, could not articulate or 
express this fundamental right whose alienation constitutes 
the denial of one’s human dignity. Yet, as Arendt observed 
and to some degree experienced, it was precisely as a mere 
human, stripped of the markers of nationality and citizen-
ship, that the refugee appeared. Moreover within Arendt’s 
analysis the phenomenon of statelessness emerges as a 
symptom of the contradiction inherent between the expan-
sion of the system of the nation-state and the earlier notion 
of inalienable rights arising out of man’s nature. Th e gen-
esis of this tension is exemplifi ed in the French Revolution’s 
simultaneous and, ultimately contradictory, expression of 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the demand for 
the national sovereignty of the people. Th e people were at 
once supposed to have universal rights and unlimited polit-
ical power—but only as members of a nation, and therefore 
the sovereign political force therein. Arendt writes:
Th e same essential rights were at once claimed as the inalienable 
heritage of all human beings and as the specifi c heritage of specifi c 
nations, the same nation was at once declared to be subject to the 
laws, which supposedly would fl ow from the Rights of Man, and 
sovereign, that is, bound by no universal law and acknowledging 
nothing superior to itself.5
In her tracing of a genealogy of the modern nation-state, 
we see that the crisis of modern statelessness, as precipi-
tated by the exclusionary logic of what had been thought to 
be “human rights,” lies in this underlying tension between 
the state and the nation, as well as that between universal 
rights and civil rights. Arendt’s analysis suggests that the 
phenomenon of statelessness is not merely coeval with the 
rise of the nation-state system, but a direct extension of the 
logic of sovereignty that system is predicated upon. But what 
perhaps was most striking about the position of the refugee 
was the way in which denationalization related to the condi-
tions that underwrite the human ability to act inhumanely 
to others. Within Arendt’s analysis the situation of the refu-
gee is tantamount to the loss of the intersubjective “modes 
in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as 
physical objects, but qua men.”6 Th us within Arendt’s analy-
sis the phenomenon of statelessness is not only symptomatic 
of contemporary exclusionary modes of community and the 
concomitant tensions between human rights and state sover-
eignty, but actually constitutive of modalities of relatedness 
that allow human rights violations to take place.
As I have tried to emphasize above, the phenomenon of 
statelessness is fundamentally tied to the tension we fi nd 
between the universalizing impulse of human rights dis-
course and the limitations imposed by our current under-
standings of citizenship and the state. As the sociologist 
Saskia Sassen has noted of the developments of the inter-
war era, “the emergent interstate system was the key to 
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the creation of the stateless person, the identifi cation of 
refugees as such, and their regulation or control.”7 Indeed, 
perhaps what is most remarkable about Arendt’s insights 
is how pertinent they remain for our contemporary situa-
tion. Th e primary international response to the issues posed 
by statelessness has been the constitution of intergovern-
mental organizations responsible for overseeing the con-
dition of refugees—but these institutions are themselves 
symptomatic of the only intensifi ed pervasiveness of state-
lessness within the world. Moreover, despite the presence of 
emerging norms concerning the question of humanitarian 
intervention, in which sovereignty has become understood 
as contingent upon the state’s responsibility to protect,8 
norms regarding the position of refugees and asylum seek-
ers have become only more ambiguous in relation to the pre-
rogatives of raison d’etat. Th ree remarkable, though by no 
means isolated, recent illustrations of the unresolved nature 
of these tensions clearly indicate the crucial limitations of 
modern human rights norms for dealing with such issues. 
Th e fi rst has been the 2001–2008 “Pacifi c Solution” of the 
Australian government, under which a system of off shore 
detention centres was established for individuals entering 
the country without valid papers in order to provide greater 
discretion in the evaluation of asylum seekers without vio-
lating the human rights norms that come into eff ect with 
landed status. Such a system, which lived on in the country’s 
mandatory detention policy, led to the pervasive long-term 
incarceration of asylum seekers and refugees.9 Th e second 
notable case is to be found in the intervening stages of the 
British Belmarsh decision of 2004 which allowed the UK 
government to detain indefi nitely non-citizens who would 
normally face deportation, but who could not be deported 
without derogation from human rights obligations because 
of the risk they faced of being tortured in their country 
of origin. Th e paradoxical outcome of this situation was 
the legalization of indefi nite incarceration without trial 
for non-citizens under the aegis of conforming to human 
rights norms, although the legality of this aff ront to the 
rule of law was eventually overturned.10 More remarkable, 
at just the moment when institutional innovations such as 
the Schengen Agreement in Europe are beginning to sup-
posedly de-territorialize states and break down borders, 
“detention camps for foreigners have mushroomed across 
the European Union” with experiments with the external-
ization of borders along the lines of the “Pacifi c Solution” 
already beginning to take form through multilateral agree-
ments with bordering states.11 While these cases provide 
extreme examples of the confl ict between human rights 
norms and state sovereignty within the policies of advanced 
industrial democracies, they are merely emblematic of 
general contradictory features of our international system. 
Civil wars, natural disasters, widespread poverty, and failed 
states, amid a world of only tightening borders, have only 
increased the number of people caught between the inter-
stices of our international order.
I would contend, along with Arendt, that the underlying 
source of our contemporary inability to manage these path-
ologies of the nation-state system lies in the exclusionary 
nature of our current forms of citizenship and our inability 
to recognize the fundamental nature of the right to belong 
to a community. Indeed, what is perhaps most remarkable 
about our current era of globalization is that, with suppos-
edly growing mobility and interconnectedness across the 
world, the ability of human persons to move across borders 
would pale in comparison to that of international trade and 
monetary exchange. Th e costs of this contradictory logic are 
of course born heavily by those who fi nd themselves on the 
outside of states, or as the “others” of the citizens within 
nations. But while Arendt’s work brings to the fore the 
untenable nature of our current conceptions of community 
and the fundamental limitations of human rights discourse, 
her insightful analysis provides us with only a problema-
tization of the issues at hand.12
Discourse Ethics and the Right to Belong
Having provided a provisional sketch of the problematic con-
ceptual challenges raised by the phenomenon of statelessness, 
I would now like to turn to the theoretical approach toward 
these issues that can be articulated through an engagement 
with Habermas’s work, in particular the mode of philo-
sophical justifi cation he has developed under the rubric of 
discourse ethics. Th e salience of Habermas’s thought for 
addressing the conceptual problems of statelessness raised 
initially by Arendt is suggested by the critical edge discourse 
ethics potentially off ers for interrogating and dislodging the 
presuppositions that currently underpin our exclusionary 
conceptions of “belonging” necessary to the production of 
statelessness. Indeed, in the way they are entwined with the 
ideas of community, citizenship and human rights, the issues 
of inclusion raised by statelessness seem to be intimately tied 
to “questions having to do with the grammar of forms of life” 
in our late modern era.13 Moreover the broader focus of his 
larger project of the theory of communicative action, with 
its focus on intersubjective engagement and attentiveness to 
the distorting eff ects of power relations, further confi rms the 
promise of appealing to his work within the context of our 
present discussion.14
In taking up Habermas’s approach of discourse ethics for 
the issue of statelessness, I will interpret Habermas as a post-
metaphysical, non-foundationalist theorist.15 Based on this 
reading, I suggest the promise of his approach lies in provid-
ing a conceptualization of the issues raised by statelessness 
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and citizenship without having to rely upon problematic 
philosophical or metaphysical assumptions that oft en seem 
to underpin our understanding of human rights. Given the 
cautionary warning that Arendt’s analysis off ers regarding 
the fragility of such premises, a theoretical commitment to 
non-foundationalism in our conceptual approach seems 
most prudent and promising. Granted, this reading of 
Habermas as eschewing foundationalism in his approach 
to communicative action is somewhat complicated by his 
apparent essentialism regarding the nature of language as 
having as its “inherent telos” the reaching of mutual under-
standing.16 However the apparent import of such accusa-
tions of a hidden foundationalism are themselves seemingly 
overstated.17 Moreover, regardless of whether we are fully 
sanctioned in interpreting Habermas’s theoretical commit-
ments in this way, I believe we can easily take up his pos-
ition while still acknowledging that his account of language 
may merely have the status of, to use Connolly’s phrase, 
“premises deeply rooted in modernity itself.”18 Moreover, 
the appropriation of an approach said to be rooted in the 
emergence of modernity itself seems entirely appropriate for 
interrogating the distinctively modern forms of community 
and collective identity that are implicated in the production 
of statelessness.19
In turning to Habermas’s framework, we should begin 
by recognizing that the approach of discourse ethics is 
best understood as an extension of the conception of 
communicative “rationality” presented in Th e Th eory of 
Communicative Action. Th e conception of communicative 
rationality, according to Habermas, “carries with it con-
notations based ultimately on the central experience of the 
unconstrained, unifying, consensus bringing force of argu-
mentative speech.”20 Appealing to our everyday intuitions, 
Habermas points to the basis of this conception of rational-
ity in our ability to give reasons or justifi cations for certain 
modes of action or statements about our social world, a ten-
dency that Habermas explicitly links with the redeeming of 
normative claims.21 In reconstructing a moral theory from 
the suppositions of unconstrained argumentative discourse, 
Habermas begins with the constrained assumption that 
normative claims can be redeemed in a way analogous to 
truth claims.22 Th e weakening of the cognitivist commit-
ments of Habermas’s approach and the consequent limit-
ing of the transcendental scope of discourse ethics to “give 
up any claim to ‘ultimate justifi cation’” is itself consistent 
with understanding of norms that Habermas attributes to 
the post-conventional era of modernity.23 Th e approach of 
discourse ethics is therefore best understood as the work-
ing out of implications of his conception of communica-
tive rationality in relation to claims of normative validity 
and moral legitimacy. As Th omas McCarthy notes, for 
Habermas the elaboration of the principles of ethics justifi -
cation “begins with a refl ective turn, for these principles are 
built into the very structure of practical discourse itself.”24 
Th erefore it is the model of argumentative discourse that 
provides the principle of discourse ethics, that “only those 
norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with 
the approval of all aff ected in their capacity as participants 
in a practical discourse.”25 Th e principle of discourse eth-
ics therefore stipulates the intersubjective condition under 
which a norm can be justifi ed as expressing the common 
will of the plurality of those who will be aff ected.
Before turning toward the application of discourse eth-
ics within our current context, it is important to note the 
relation of Habermas’s approach to the tradition of Kantian 
moral theory, if only to stress its crucial divergences. As a 
deontological approach, Kant’s monistic oriented moral 
theory attempts to avoid the issue of confl icting obligations 
by claiming to show that the categorical imperative itself is 
adequate as a moral standard for validating norms or max-
ims. In this way the Habermassian approach can be seen as 
an extension of the Kantian tradition with notable modi-
fi cations: the rejection of the metaphysical division of the 
world into the nominal and the phenomenal realm, and the 
insistence on a dialogical basis for moral consciousness. For 
Habermas the criterion is, contra Kant, not what the indi-
vidual can will without contradiction, but what all aff ected 
parties can agree to within rationally grounded discourse. 
Key to Habermas’s approach is the way he construes the 
universalizing dimension of moral discourse in a decentred 
fashion. Hence the criterion of impartiality for discourse 
ethics, taken from the suppositions of everyday communi-
cation, is captured in the principle of universalism for the 
validity of every norm, such that: “All aff ected can accept 
the consequences and the side eff ects its general observance 
can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s 
interests.”26 Th is is because Habermas identifi es the fault 
in Kantian approaches to the principle of universalization 
as lying in the reliance on the orientation of a subject-cen-
tred perspective. Such approaches fail to fully acknowledge 
that “valid norms must deserve recognition from all con-
cerned” and instead presents a conception of moral norms 
in which the “process of judging is relative to the vantage 
point and perspective of some and not all concerned.”27 
Moreover, Habermas’s approach openly acknowledges the 
situated nature of the participants to discourse, and there-
fore attempts to avoid the monological and transcendental 
dimensions of the Kantian tradition. As Habermas writes: 
“Discourses take place in particular social contexts and are 
subject to the limitations of time and space  … their par-
ticipants are not Kant’s intelligible characters but real 
human beings.”28 In alternatively proposing a principle 
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that “constrains all aff ected to adopt the perspectives of all 
others in the balance of interests” one can read Habermas 
as following up on the Hegelian critique of the “abstract 
universal” of Kantian morality that had initially suggested 
an attentiveness to the intersubjective dimension of inter-
action so central to the overall project of communicative 
action.29 Within the domain of our concerns over the ques-
tion of inclusion, this aspect of Habermas’s theory import-
antly tethers the approach of discourse ethics and grounds 
the criteria of the intersubjective validation of norms in the 
situated nature of participants.
In turning to the evaluation of the norms underlying the 
prerogatives of national territory and state sovereignty, we 
should begin by briefl y drawing attention to the implicit 
forms of ethical justifi cation that underwrite our contem-
porary understandings of citizenship and national com-
munities. Th e claims of modern states to exercise control 
over their borders and defi ne the limits of community 
membership extend from the logic of self-determination—
itself rooted in the idea of democratic legitimacy and 
popular sovereignty.30 Th e basis of this understanding of 
self-determination is put succinctly by Michael Walzer in 
his description of the state as “constituted by the union 
of people and government, and it is the state that claims 
against all other states the twin rights of territorial integrity 
and political sovereignty.”31 Under this mode of justifi ca-
tion, the prerogatives of territorial control and the demar-
cation of citizenship stem from the right of a nation or 
people to determine the structure and form of their mode 
of collective life. In this sense, it is by appeal to the claim of 
self-determination that the exclusion of the asylum seeker 
and refugee are purportedly legitimated by the traditional 
norms of national sovereignty. Moreover, from the stand-
point of citizenship, one might infer that part of the moral 
justifi cation of the bounded nature of states would have to 
be tied up with the claim of all to membership. In this sense, 
the claim to community, which must clearly imply the 
exclusion of those outside the boundaries of such a group, is 
supposedly redeemed by the expectation that those without 
have recourse to their own forms of self-determining pol-
itical membership. At least as much seems to be implied in 
the somewhat euphemistic term of “displaced persons”—as 
if the issues posed by statelessness were merely the prod-
ucts of disturbances of the interstate system, rather than 
symptomatic of deeper problems.32 However, in this con-
text it is crucial to note that in understanding the claim to 
community as both a normative and a moral demand, we 
need to recognize that the universalizing dimension of such 
an appeal must be directed both to those within and those 
outside particular polities. But as we have seen in our ear-
lier interrogation of the relation of citizenship to the state, 
the production of refugees seems to be inherent in the logic 
of our contemporary forms of community. How are we to 
reconcile the status of the modern state as the underlying 
source of the crisis of statelessness, and as the only means by 
which a “right to have rights” may be secured?
Having laid out in broad outline the current structure 
of presumptions that underwrite our contemporary under-
standing of citizenship and polity, it should be apparent that 
the framework of discourse ethics forces us to re-evaluate 
the legitimacy of such norms. From the impartial and inclu-
sive perspective suggested by discourse ethics, the norma-
tive privileging of the position of the citizen cannot simply 
be presumed, while the sovereign prerogatives of the state 
to control entrance and limit citizenship are now in need of 
substantial justifi cation. In asking us to consider whether 
our current norms of citizenship and sovereignty would be 
accepted by all those aff ected by such norms, we must clearly 
take into consideration the position of those who are most 
disadvantaged by such institutions and who fi nd themselves 
asymmetrically located in relation to citizens—that is, at the 
periphery or outside the bounds of inclusion. In this appro-
priation of discourse ethics, normative justifi cation cannot 
be merely circumscribed to the concerns of those within 
political communities, but must come to account for those 
without. Moreover, while our reading of Arendt brought to 
the fore the factors producing statelessness at its emergence 
as a mass phenomenon, at our current historical juncture 
the claims to validity of such norms have only become more 
problematic as the idea and integrity of the nation-state has 
itself become conceptually dubious. Th e question that dis-
course ethics asks us to raise is whether the norms of sover-
eignty and self-determination that allow individual states 
to set the criteria of entrance and control the distribution 
of citizenship can be fully justifi ed when the perspective of 
the refugee is taken into account. In a sense, the issue of 
whether the number of claimants who fulfi ll the qualifi ca-
tions for the status of asylum seekers or refugees are actually 
admitted by states that claim to adhere to human rights is 
actually secondary for our current considerations. From the 
perspective of discourse ethics, the real question is whether 
such stringent and exclusionary criteria can be justifi ed at 
all.
When taking into consideration the perspective of those 
caught in between communities or who fi nd themselves 
admitted under a precarious or illicit status—asylum seek-
ers, refugees, immigrants—we have good reason to doubt 
the acceptability of contemporary norms of citizenship and 
territorial sovereignty. Indeed, if our foregoing analysis is 
correct in suggesting a fundamental relation between our 
current modalities of community and citizenship with the 
practices of exclusion that produce statelessness, we have 
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good reason to believe that a moral imperative exists for 
weakening the boundaries of states and liberalizing the 
means of gaining membership within communities. While 
still allowing for the values of cultural integrity and com-
munal life, a consideration of the question of inclusion 
from the position of all those aff ected by the exclusionary 
norms of membership will clearly push us to take up a more 
cosmopolitan perspective. One form this might take is in 
the recognition of a fundamental right to claim citizenship 
within a polity—with the burden of proof against such a 
claim lying on the part of the state. Th e development and 
articulation of such a right to belong would not necessar-
ily be incompatible with some forms of communal integrity. 
However such claims will have to be justifi ed in relation 
to the claims of those outside of a particular state, and not 
simply decided in advance by the presumptive bias of the 
national interest.
As I have tried to indicate in the foregoing discussion, the 
approach of discourse ethics when universally applied to 
the realm of those aff ected by our contemporary norms of 
citizenship and sovereignty forces us to reconsider the con-
tours of our current practices. However, I would also like to 
suggest that the formal dimensions of discourse ethics raise 
certain issues for our attempt to address the particular con-
cerns brought to the fore by statelessness and point to the 
limitations that such an engagement will have to overcome. 
As Habermas himself notes of his approach, the principle 
of discourse ethics is procedural rather then substantive 
in form, making reference to the discursive process of the 
evaluation of normative claims to validity. As he writes:
To this extent discourse ethics can properly be characterized as 
formal … Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating 
justifi ed norms but a procedure for testing the validity of norms 
that are being proposed and hypothetically considered for adop-
tion. Th at means that practical discourses depend on content 
brought to them from the outside.33
Th us, much like the Kantian conception of morality based 
on the categorical imperative that it aims to supersede, dis-
course ethics itself is not aimed at the generation of moral 
norms, but rather off ers a way of evaluating and potentially 
legitimating norms that are brought into question. However 
as we have noted above, unlike the monological dimension 
of the Kantian approach, Habermas explicitly constructs 
discourse ethics around a communicative model, thereby 
explicitly emphasizing the dimension of intersubjective 
agreement between a community of participants.34 Yet the 
very virtue of discourse ethics in attempting to base the 
validation of norms in the actual participation of concrete 
agents in practical discourse itself raises questions about 
how the realm of participants is constituted. As Habermas 
notes, the very idea of practical discourse is dependent on 
a “horizon provided by the lifeworld of a specifi c social 
group  …” and thereby tied to particularized conceptions of 
community.35 Moreover, the very means in which the norm 
in question is itself conceptualized—a matter of economics, 
of immigration, of human rights—seems to radically shift  
our sense of the scope of relevant participants, and indeed 
points to the question of how those bounds are themselves 
politically constituted. An instructive example of this is 
the gradual shift  we have seen in the past few decades in 
the refugee policies of many Western industrial democra-
cies. Arguably, there has been a widespread move in policy 
away from conceptualizing such issues as concerning 
human rights, and toward treating the claims of refugees 
and asylum seekers primarily as an immigration question. 
Such trends are exemplifi ed more recently in the emergence 
of policies designed to defl ect claimants without violating 
international obligations, such as the Safe Th ird Country 
Agreement between the United States and Canada.36 Th ese 
developments of course imply the normative privileging 
of the position of citizens by more fully excluding poten-
tial claimants themselves from the realm of parties whose 
views and positions are fully relevant to the formulation 
of policy. Such issues only highlight the possible diffi  cul-
ties in addressing what it would mean to have stateless 
persons play a role in the adjudication of the norms that 
would secure their inclusion in the fi rst place. Th e poten-
tiality of discourse ethics to validate new and intrinsically 
open forms of community is clear from our earlier discus-
sion, but from our contemporary standpoint we seem ter-
ribly far from having adopted the “enlarged mentality” that 
the implementation of such considerations would seem to 
demand. Moreover, the rootedness of our fundamental con-
ceptions of democratic legitimacy in the idea of bounded 
communities makes the leap to the standpoint of “citizen of 
the world,” or even to a post-national consciousness, seem-
ingly rather distant. Th is suggests that addressing the issue 
of statelessness in the present requires that we direct our 
attention toward problematizing the very notions of citizen 
and “people” that seemingly necessitate political closure.
Th eorizing the Contingency and Contestability 
of Community
Having drawn attention to the potential and limits of 
discourse ethics to point the way toward more inclusive 
understandings of community and citizenship, we will 
now engage with the emergent perspective of agonistic 
democratic theorists in order to suggest ways in which the 
idea of a “people” itself can be understood as intrinsically 
open. As indicated above, the central dilemma facing our 
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attempt to overcome the issues posed by statelessness is 
that the position of the refugee is itself one of exclusion and 
in a sense constitutes a form of identity which seemingly 
eludes solidarity. Th erefore any attempt to overcome the 
particular challenges posed by statelessness and the attempt 
to articulate a fundamental right to belong to community 
will crucially have to underwrite the modes of inclusion 
necessary to bring those who fall outside of the commun-
ity within the threshold of the relevant. It is with this aim 
in mind that we turn to writers such as William Connolly 
and Chantal Mouff e, who have helped develop and articu-
late the agonistic approach toward democratic theory that 
places the issues of confl ict and contestation at the centre 
of the political. Using their insights I will further develop 
our engagement with the issue of statelessness along three 
dimensions: the unsettled nature of our concepts of citizen 
and “people,” the constitutive tension between liberalism 
and democracy, and the potentiality for more inclusive and 
open notions of community that the agonistic vision of pol-
itics suggests. Th ese considerations will bring to light how 
we should understand the basis and bounds of community 
as always inherently contingent, and therefore help culti-
vate the orientation necessary to be attentive to the needs 
of those excluded.
Before beginning our engagement with the work of the 
aforementioned theorists it seems best to briefl y address 
and defuse the apparent opposition that such perspectives 
have been claimed to have with the approach of deliberative 
democracy that Habermas’s work is associated with. Given 
the oft en emphasized challenge that the agonistic concep-
tion of democratic politics claims to pose to the approach 
toward radical democracy stemming from the critical 
theory of Habermas, the attempt to supplement our under-
standing of the issue of statelessness by turning to both 
traditions is in need of some explanation. Chantal Mouff e 
in particular has continually emphasized the divergences 
between the agonistic approach toward the political and the 
understanding of politics expressed in the work of delibera-
tive democrats that follow Habermas, with their emphasis 
on rationalism and consensus.37 However, I believe that 
the claims of Mouff e and others of an extreme divergence 
between the two approaches are greatly overstated—at least 
insofar as such claims suggest that we deny the fruitfulness 
of an engagement between the perspectives. As Simone 
Chambers writes:
Discourse ethics does not project the ideal of a dispute-free 
world, nor does it devalue contestation. Not only is such a world 
unattainable, it is also undesirable. Diversity and diff erence lead 
to criticism, and criticism leads to well founded norms.38
Positing a radical opposition between the two perspectives 
and their respective emphasis on the values of political con-
testation/confl ict and consensus obscures how they can be 
brought together creatively. Moreover, Mouff e’s tendency 
to criticize the consensus-oriented dimension of discourse 
ethics shows a failure to appreciate the central role of the 
contestation of norms to Habermas’s approach. Such an 
understanding of his project is echoed in Patchen Markell’s 
reading of Habermas’s project as understanding “demo-
cratic politics as an unending process of contestation” in 
which there is a clear recognition that “no actually existing 
settlement can constitute a satisfactory embodiment of the 
regulative idea of agreement.”39 While this is not the place 
to develop a full response to Habermas’s detractors, the 
notions of disagreement and dissent play important roles 
in Habermas’s theory which are oft en obscured by readings 
that tend to mistakenly classify his work along with that of 
Rawls.40 However, such commentators are right insofar as 
they contend that the agonistic approach does provide us 
with a critical purchase on particular elements of political 
practice by distinctively emphasizing a model of politics 
centred around confl ict, and it is precisely this focus we 
should engage with to supplement our developing approach 
toward statelessness.
Having indicated the general direction of my engage-
ment with agonistic perspectives, I would like to fi rst turn 
to William Connolly’s analysis of the inherently contested 
nature of our central political concepts in his book Th e 
Terms of Political Discourse. One of Connolly’s central 
aims in this work is to challenge the prevalent assump-
tion within the social sciences that the language of politics 
is somehow a neutral medium that merely coveys mean-
ing and to “focus attention on the locus of space for con-
testation” that exists within “the fi ne meshes of social and 
political vocabularies themselves.”41 Taking an expressiv-
ist perspective on language, Connolly draws our attention 
to the fact that discussions over the “correct use of partly 
shared appraisal concepts are themselves an intrinsic part 
of politics” and introduces the idea of “essentially contested 
concepts” to denote such terms.42 In this way, he carefully 
frames his analysis of political discourse in opposition to 
what he calls “empiricist” or “rationalist” tendencies within 
political science in order to highlight the deeply political 
valence of our arguments over the use of such words as 
“democracy,” “power,” and “freedom.” Connolly’s emphasis 
on the potentialities of contestation and the internal discord 
within our political language emphasizes a certain vision 
of the political as essentially open. As he writes: “Politics 
is, at its best, simultaneously a medium in which unsettled 
dimensions of a common life fi nd expression and a mode by 
which a temporary or permanent settlement is sometimes 
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achieved.”43 Th us, perhaps most importantly for our pur-
poses, Connolly’s work highlights the political dimension 
of language itself in ways that enable us to track potential 
opportunities for political innovation by allowing us to 
“expose conceptual closure when it has been imposed arti-
fi cially.”44 In this way, what Connolly’s analysis forces us to 
confront is the continually partial and incomplete nature of 
our core political concepts. Th is suggests that the extension 
and meaning of such concepts as community and citizen-
ship can never be said to be fully decided, while our under-
standings of such central ideas as “justice” at any specifi c 
moment are to be understood as always the conception of a 
particular group and therefore always open to contestation 
and further negotiation. In this way, distancing ourselves 
from the approach toward our social world that treats such 
questions as static and “operationalizable” allows us to see 
that our central concepts are not any more settled than the 
actual communities within which we live.
Connolly’s insights on the inherent contestability of our 
central political concepts has a central import for our dis-
cussion of how we might overcome the forms of exclusion 
that produce the situation of statelessness. In particular, the 
very idea of the bounds of a “people” and the notion of cit-
izenship are revealed as themselves highly contested in the 
very way Connolly’s analysis suggests. In no context attuned 
to the complexities of our political landscape can we truly 
speak of the category of citizen as having a fi xed nature, or 
of a particular shibboleth—whether of language, ethnicity, 
race, nationality, gender, or class—that defi nes the bounds 
of political membership once and for all. Th e disputed and 
variable status of the idea of the citizen is echoed in the 
work of Judith Shklar, who has pointed out that “there is no 
notion more central in politics than citizenship, and none 
more variable in history or contested in theory.”45 While on 
some banal level citizenship can be understood as a particu-
lar relationship between the individual and the state, the 
contours of that membership and the status it confers have 
varied widely through the tradition of Western thought. 
Such sentiments regarding the contingent and potential 
variability of our social practices of inclusion and exclusion 
are brought to mind in Chantal Mouff e’s statement that:
What is at a given moment considered the ‘natural order’—jointly 
with the ‘common sense’ which accompanies it—is the result of 
sedimented practices; it is never the manifestation of a deeper 
objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being.46
Placing this dimension of contestability at the centre of 
our thinking about citizenship therefore helps us keep in 
mind the inherent contingency to any idea of a “people” 
and allows us to cultivate a sense of solidarity with those 
outside our particular form of community by viewing 
them always as potential citizens with legitimate claims to 
our concern.
Having off ered an account of how the valence of contest-
ability can begin to orient us toward intrinsically more open 
conceptions of community, I would like to now attend to 
the elements of the tradition of agonistic theory that empha-
sis the central role of confl ict and antagonism to the realm 
of the political more generally. Much like Connolly, the 
work of Mouff e also centres around the radical potentiality 
of a conception of politics that emphasizes the value of con-
testation for forestalling the threat of closure that seemingly 
haunts our democratic practices. However, Mouff e in par-
ticular carries the thematic of contestation to the extreme 
in order to argue for the irreducibility and ineliminability of 
the potential for antagonism within the domain of the pol-
itical. Mouff e’s antagonistic conception of politics is in part 
indebted to a tempered engagement with the work of Carl 
Schmitt that draws off  his insistence on the fundamentally 
“confl ictual nature of politics” and the importance of recog-
nizing the antagonistic and relational basis of identity, while 
rejecting his insistence on the “existence of a homogenous 
demos.”47 According to Mouff e, this revised vision of pol-
itics centred around the ever-present possibility of confl ict 
is both more in tune with the oppositional foundation of 
identity and more open to the potentials for radical chal-
lenge and transformation that democracy allows.
Within Mouff e’s interpretation of modern democracy, 
our fundamental framework of political activity is struc-
tured by the paradoxical tension between democracy as a 
form of rule and the symbolic framework of legalism, rights, 
and equality, that characterizes liberalism.48 Drawing off  
the insights of Schmitt’s critique of the liberal understand-
ing of politics while rejecting his dismissal of liberalism, 
Mouff e emphasizes how this “democratic paradox” between 
the two components of our modern framework of politics 
leads to a permanent site of tension, for “no fi nal resolution 
between these two confl icting logics is possible” with our 
options limited to only precarious and temporary nego-
tiations of this divide.49 More fundamentally, we can read 
Mouff e’s identifi cation of the confl icting logic of liberal 
democracy as part of the deeper tension between legality 
and the sovereign will of the demos. Th e signature of this 
confl ict runs like a red thread through the history of pol-
itical theory. Emblematic of this are Aristotle’s discussions 
in the Politics of the tension between the will of the people 
and the laws of the polity, as well as Rousseau’s opaque 
considerations on how to resolve that tension in a period at 
which liberalism was more a nascent theory than an estab-
lished tradition.50 Yet Mouff e does helpfully fl ag how this 
tension is itself deepened by the advent of liberalism and 
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its emphasis on equality and rights discourse. As Mouff e 
notes:
By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-exclusion 
implied by the political constitution of the “people”—required 
by the exercise of democracy—the liberal discourse of universal 
human rights plays an important role in maintaining the demo-
cratic contestation alive. On the other side, it is only thanks to 
the democratic logics of equivalence that frontiers can be created 
and a demos established without which no real exercise of rights 
would be possible.51
By dramatizing the site of liberal democracy as contingent 
and unstable, her analysis brings to the fore the radically 
precarious and problematic dimension of any attempt 
to permanently articulate more inclusive and open con-
ceptions of community. Moreover, Mouff e’s warning 
regarding the fragility of any particular political confi g-
uration is exceedingly apt in our current age of the “war 
on terror” when the civil rights of citizens, let alone those 
of resident aliens and non-nationals, have been notably 
eroded under more or less democratic institutions. As she 
notes of political negotiations in general, “every order is 
the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent 
practices”—a point that emphasizes the provisional and 
limited character of any political “solution.”52 Such obser-
vations speak directly to the concerns at hand by asking 
us to temper the cosmopolitan aspirations and pretensions 
of any project with the recognition that the negotiation of 
the terms of political membership is always inherently an 
ongoing political project and can never be considered a fait 
accompli. Recognizing that the universalizing tendencies 
of liberalism and human rights discourse exist in tension 
with the potentialities of popular sovereignty brings to 
light the ever present potential to reconstitute more open 
notions of community membership necessary to secure a 
“right to belong,” while also stressing the precariousness of 
such arrangements.
Conclusion: Toward Practices of Inclusion
Our aforementioned reading of theorists from within the 
agonistic tradition of radical democracy has attempted to 
illustrate how an understanding of the political centred 
around confl ict and contestation can be put to the uses 
of overcoming the conditions that produces statelessness 
in our contemporary world. Such an engagement argu-
ably provides a needed supplement to the Habermassian 
approach toward statelessness by positing new modalities 
for understanding citizenship as intrinsically open, and 
therefore provides a basis for including those presently 
excluded from our forms of community in our realm of 
moral concern. However, while our discussion of agonism 
has highlighted the essentially contestable nature of claims 
to collective identity, it is crucial to emphasize that such 
contestability is not equally open to all. Th is is a crucial 
insight that is emphasized in Lawrie Balfour’s recent pro-
ject of putting agonistic theory and reparations politics into 
conversation, because it brings to the fore the limitations of 
our own attempt to engage with the tradition of agonistic 
theory to diagnose the pathologies of exclusionary citizen-
ship practices. As Balfour saliently points out:
Even if all identities are ultimately unstable or contestable, even 
if they are all produced through rather than revealing founda-
tional truths about individuals or communities, they are neither 
produced in the same way or contestable to the same degree. To 
assume that they are is to overlook crucial asymmetries between 
members of diff erent identity groups.53
Within the context of our current discussion, such con-
siderations draw attention to the fact that it is just those 
who are most disadvantaged by our current practices of 
citizenship who shall also be least able to challenge the 
norms that produce contemporary forms of exclusion. 
While the agonistic lens provides a powerful perspective 
for destabilizing and challenging our conceptions of com-
munity, we must also remain attentive to how the poten-
tiality for contestation is oft en structurally determined. 
Remaining cognizant of this issue emphasizes the import-
ance of developing forms and practices of solidarity as part 
of the project of re-conceptualizing our notions of citizen-
ship. Such considerations suggest that the limitations of 
the agonistic perspective point to the need to foster local 
potentialities of community in ways that may allow us to 
transcend the problematic bounds of the state and build 
the forms of solidarity necessary for more inclusive orien-
tations of citizenship. While such potentialities remain 
fragmentary and uncertain at present, such experiments in 
developing alternative practices of citizenship will have to 
play a central role in any practical attempt to grapple with 
the issues raised by statelessness.
Notes
 1. Hannah Arendt, Th e Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 277.
 2. Given that there is an obvious political dimension to the 
classifi cation of individuals as refugees, it is worth not-
ing that the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
estimates that there are over 190 million immigrants 
worldwide.
 3. As the reader will note, perhaps with some frustration, I 
follow Arendt in using the terms “stateless person” and 
 Re-theorizing Human Rights through the Refugee 
33
“refugee” interchangeably. Th is choice is deliberate. Th e 
perspective motivating this paper and developed in my 
subsequent work assumes that the seemingly helpful, or 
at worst innocuous, proliferation of legal categories and 
types of statelessness we have witnessed should be under-
stood as potentially pernicious. Th is paper focuses on 
problematizing the terms of inclusion; a related concern 
is obviously the power of states in shaping and defi ning 
the catagories of exclusion. Th e very categories of status—
refugee, IDP, asylum seeker, or more recently climate 
refugee—are instantiated and controlled by states, agents 
with clear interests in manipulating the scope and impli-
cations of such designations. Th us it is worth considering 
how this proliferation of categories of persons exempli-
fi es an epistemic exercise of power, given that such pro-
cesses of identifi cation allow states to circumscribe and 
frequently circumvent the moral and legal claims of indi-
viduals. Against this proliferation of categories related to 
political exclusion, in my work I use a broader conception 
of statelessness meant to encompass a range of forms of 
political exclusion arising from the refusal of access to the 
protection and well-being that citizens are understood to 
be owed by the state.
 4. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 280.
 5. Ibid., 230.
 6. Hannah Arendt, Th e Human Condition (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1958), 176.
 7. Saskia Sassen, Guests and Aliens (New York: New Press, 
2000), 84.
 8. Th omas Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2007), 116.
 9. Human Rights Watch, “‘Not for Export’ Why the Inter-
national Community Should Reject Australia’s Refugee 
Policies,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 
2002); Ian MacKinnon, “Australia Opens Controver-
sial Asylum Centre on Christmas Island,” Th e Guardian, 
December 19, 2008.
 10. On this, see David Dyzenhaus, Th e Constitution of Law: 
Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).
 11. Caroline Brother, “Obscurity and Confi nement for 
Migrants in Europe,” International Herald Tribune, 
December 30, 2007.
 12. I have elsewhere argued that Arendt’s work implicitly 
contains a response to the paradox posed by statelessness 
in her critique of sovereignty. But I have begun to have 
doubts whether such an account is a suffi  cient enough 
basis for theorizing substantive solutions to the problems 
posed by statelessness. Hence this paper, which takes 
Arendt’s work as a starting point for engaging with more 
disparate perspectives.
 13. Jürgen Habermas, Th e Th eory of Communicative Action, 
vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 
392.
 14. Such decentred and intersubjective features of Habermas’s 
approach are in marked contrast to the conceptual lineage 
we fi nd in the work of John Rawls, whose subject-centred 
approach clearly has its roots in Kantian moral philoso-
phy. Given the marked inattentiveness of Rawls’s work on 
global justice to the questions raised by statelessness, such 
divergences are suggestive of the potential of discourse 
ethics.
 15. Habermas, Th eory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 387–88.
 16. Jürgen Habermas, Th e Th eory of Communicative Action, 
vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. T. 
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 287.
 17. Th is reading of Habermas seems to be vindicated by his 
claim to be adopting the position of someone who is 
“operating without metaphysical support and is also no 
longer confi dent that a rigorous transcendental-pragmatic 
program, claiming to provide ultimate grounds, can be 
carried out;” Th eory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 137. 
Also, for a related discussion of the “hypothetical and fal-
lible” universalism of Habermas’s approach, see Simone 
Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and 
the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 162.
 18. William Connolly, Th e Terms of Political Discourse 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 241.
 19. Th e relation between the approach of discourse ethics as 
an extension of communicative action to the conditions of 
modernity is clear from its dependency on the world dif-
ferentiation that Habermas attributes to shift  to modernity. 
See Habermas, Th eory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 52.
 20. Ibid., 10.
 21. Ibid., 8.
 22. Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communica-
tive Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Nicholsen (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 76.
 23. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action, 77.
 24. Th omas McCarthy, Th e Critical Th eory of Jürgen Haber-
mas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 324.
 25. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action, 66.
 26. Ibid., 65 (original emphasis).
 27. Ibid., 65 (original emphasis).
 28. Ibid., 92.
 29. Jürgen Habermas, Th eory and Practice, trans. J. Viertel 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 144–46; Habermas, Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, 65.
 30. Such norms are woven into our current structures of inter-
national order in the form of the central role respect for 
state sovereignty occupies in the UN Charter.
 31. Michael Walzer, “Th e Moral Standing of States: A 
Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy and Public Aff airs 9, 
no. 3 (1980): 212.
 32. On this, see Goodwin-Gill’s discussion of the postwar re-
emergence of the term “displaced person,” and its initial 
Volume 27 Refuge Number 1
34
use as a surrogate for what were essentially refugees of 
the confl ict in Indochina; Guy Goodwin-Gill, Th e Refu-
gee in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 11–13.
 33. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action, 103.
 34. Hence this is a far cry from a mere empty formalism. See 
Jürgen Habermas, “Labor and Interaction: Remarks on 
Hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Mind During 1803–1804 and 
1805–1806” in Th eory and Practice; and also “Morality and 
Ethical Life: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant Apply to Dis-
course Ethics?” in Kant and Political Philosophy: Th e Con-
temporary Legacy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James 
Booth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
 35. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action, 103.
 36. Allan Th ompson, “Unfair Refugee Accord Should Be 
Struck Down,” Toronto Star, January 26, 2008.
 37. Chantal Mouff e, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 
2005), 12–13.
 38. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 162.
 39. Patchen Markell, “Contesting Consensus: Rereading 
Habermas on the Public Sphere,” Constellations 3, no. 3 
(1997): 379.
 40. Th e role of confl ict in his thought is perhaps most pro-
nounced in his theorizing of the public sphere as domain 
of contestation or “medium for permanent criticism;” 
Th eory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 341. Indeed, read-
ing the public sphere as the domain where the domina-
tion of public debate by organized political and economic 
interest is challenged and contested by citizens further 
emphasizes this connection.
 41. Connolly, Terms of Political Discourse, 231.
 42. Ibid., 39. Th e phrase “essentially contest concept” is used 
to refer to case in which “the concept involved is appraisive 
in that the state of aff airs it describes is a valued achieve-
ment, when the practice described is internally complex 
in that its characterization involves reference to several 
dimensions, and when the agreed and contested rules of 
application are relatively open, enabling parties to inter-
pret even those shared rules diff erently as new and unfore-
seen situations arise”; ibid., 10.
 43. Ibid., 227.
 44. Ibid., 231.
 45.  Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: Th e Quest for Inclu-
sion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 1.
 46. Mouff e, On the Political, 18.
 47. Ibid., 13–14.
 48. Chantal Mouff e, Th e Democratic Paradox (New York: 
Verso, 2000), 2.
 49. Mouff e, Democratic Paradox, 45.
 50. Aristotle, Th e Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1985), 1292al.; Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Th e Social Contract and Th e First and Second 
Discourses, trans. Susan Dunn (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 80–83.
 51. Mouff e, Democratic Paradox, 10.
 52. Mouff e, On the Political, 18.
 53. Lawrie Balfour, “Act and Fact: Slavery Reparations as a 
Democratic Politics of Reconciliation,” in Th e Politics of 
Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies, ed. W. Kymlicka 
and B. Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 99.
Kiran Banerjee is a Vanier Canada Graduate Scholar and 
doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, 
University of Toronto. His work is currently focused on ana-
lyzing the relationship of citizenship, human rights, and ter-
ritoriality in the context of contemporary democratic theory, 
in particular as they relate to issues raised by immigration 
and the position of refugees.
Th is paper was fi rst presented at the inaugural conference of 
the Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration 
Studies in 2008 and benefi ted greatly from the comments of 
participants. Additionally, the author is grateful to Howard 
Adelman, Alexis Alchorn, Ishan Banerjee, Lindsay Knight, 
Aaron Meyer, Anthony Mohen, Melvin Rogers, and Stephen 
White for valuable comments and conversations on previ-
ous draft s. Th e author would also like to thank the reviewers 
from Refuge for their suggestions.
 Re-theorizing Human Rights through the Refugee 
35
